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Environmental Law: STATES MAY No LONGER BRING A FEDERAL
COMMON LAW NUISANCE ACTION TO ABATE INTERSTATE WATER POL-

LUTION.

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S.Ct. 1784 (1981).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the landmark decision Erie Railroad v. Tomkins,' the United
States Supreme Court set forth the general proposition that the federal
courts may not provide their own rules of decision under the guise of
federal common law.2 Since Erie, however, in cases involving a significant federal interest, the Court has consistently backed away from this
rather harsh limitation on federal judicial power.' In the City of Milwaukee v. Illinois' decision, the United States Supreme Court apparently came full circle, returning to its rule preventing federal courts

from fashioning federal common law, at least in the context of interstate water pollution controversies. 5 The immediate effect of City of
Milwaukee is to preclude the states from bringing common law nui-

1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Id. at 78. "The federal common law is a body of decisional law developed by the federal
courts untrammeled by state court decisions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 550 (5th ed. 1979). The
federal common law is generally used by the federal courts "to fashion the governing rule of law
according to their own standards." Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367
(1943). Although there is no explicit, grant of authority to the federal courts, they generally derive
this law-making function from the "Constitution and ... statutes of the United States." id. at
366. See Note, 82 HARe. L. REV. 1512, 1512-17 (1969). "The construction of constitutional or
statutory language is a function that has traditionally been conceived to involve not the independent making of law but the interpretation of law made by political authority ....
In these instances it is clear that the courts, on a case-to-case basis, establish the essential substantive content of the text being construed." Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1026 (1967). The major source of the federal courts' authority to make federal common law comes from a statute containing a "grant of
federal jurisdiction ...
"adorned with a bit of legislative history." Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 413 (1964). See Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (upholding the authority of the federal
courts to fashion a federal common law decision based upon the policy of the national labor laws).
3. See. e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (federal common law may be employed when there is a federal question or right involved); Hinderlider v.
LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (rights concerning interstate waters present a federal question). See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 413 (1964). Similarly, the need for a nationally uniform
rule of decision has been said to be a sufficient interest to allow the federal courts to fashion a
common law decision. Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241-42 (10th Cir. 1971) (concerning a
uniform rule involving environmental rights). For an application of the uniform rule principle to
the situation in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981), see Illinois v. Milwaukee,
406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972).
4. 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
5. Id. at 1795.
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sance actions' demanding relief from the harmful effects of extraterritorial pollution.7
Just nine years prior to City of Milwaukee, in Illinois v. Milwau-

kee,' a case involving the same dispute and parties,' the Supreme
Court gave formal recognition to the federal common law nuisance action for the abatement of water pollution crossing state boundaries. 10
More important, the Illinois v. Milwaukee Court held that because interstate pollution is a federal concern, the nuisance action qualified for
a grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction." Because of
the Supreme Court's holding that it was no longer the only forum

6. A nuisance action results from an "activity which arises from unreasonable, unwarranted,
or unlawful use by a person of his own property, working obstruction or injury to [a] right of
another, or to the public, and producing such material annoyance, inconvenience, and discomfort
that the law will presume the resulting damage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 961 (5th ed. 1979),

cited in

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK

9 (6th ed. 1979).

In City of Milwaukee, Illinois brought the action on a public rather thin a private nuisance
theory. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) defines a public nuisance action as
"an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public." Illinois' claim is based
upon a public nuisance to the extent that the pollution of Lake Michigan was detrimental to the
health of all its citizens coming in contact with the body of water. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1788 (1981).
See also Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165 (1979), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981) (a
federal common law nuisance action is established by "injury or significant threat of injury to
some cognizable interest of complainant"). For a detailed explanation of the distinction between
public and private nuisance actions, see Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L.
REV.

997 (1966).

7. Common law nuisance suits, now the most prevalent tort action in the pollution field,
originated in a case in which, quite ironically, Missouri complained that Illinois was polluting its
waters through sewage discharges into Lake Michigan. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
The Supreme Court, relying on common law nuisance theory, held that it had authority to grant
relief when one state's waters are adversely affecting the interests of another state. Id. The basic
rationale of the Court turned upon the fact that the federal common law was an effective means
for settling disputes between states. Id. See Leybold, Federal Common Law: Judicially Established Effluent Standards As a Remedy in Federal Nuisance Actions, 7 B.C. ENVT'L. AFF. L.
REV. 293, 298-99 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Federal Nuisance Actions]. In addition to its effectiveness in resolving state disputes, the federal common law nuisance action was recognized as a
potential source of protection for a state's quasi-sovereign rights. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (state has a quasi-sovereign interest in the protection of its citizens from
the air pollution produced in another state); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (state has a
quasi-sovereign right to assure its ecological rights are protected from injury by another state);
Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) (state has a quasi-sovereign right to be free from
the extraterritorial effects of water pollution).
8. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
9. Justice Blackmun, who was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissenting, criticized the majority's decision for its basic unfairness to Illinois. Following the Supreme Court's
instruction in the Illinois v. Milwaukee decision, Illinois went through nine years of litigation only
to have this majority reverse its earlier decision. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784
(1981). According to Justice Blackmun, the decision to abolish the federal common law makes
Illinois' efforts nothing more than a "meaningless charade." Id. at 1800.
10. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1972).
11. Id. at 99.
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available to hear such a dispute between two states, 12 for the first time,
a state could initiate a common law nuisance action in a federal district
court.1

Congress severely criticized the judicial response to water pollution
as being far too "ad hoc" and "sporadic"' a method for adequately
dealing with the mounting pollution problem. 4 Just six months after
Illinois v. Milwaukee,' 5 Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCAA).' The new regulatory
scheme changed the approach to water pollution from one of state control and authority to a federal framework of standards and enforcement.17 Both Congress and the Supreme Court regarded the FWPCAA
as a "comprehensive" legislative response to the inadequacies of past
pollution control efforts.' 8
In Illinois v. Milwaukee, the Court acknowledged that, in time,
the legislature might take action which would preempt any further
need for the federal common law nuisance action." City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois20 provided the Court with the first opportunity to determine
the propriety of maintaining a federal common law nuisance action in
light of the FWPCAA." This case note explores whether, by abolishing
such a nuisance action, the Court has laid to rest what Congress intended to be an important mechanism for enforcing and effectuating
the FWPCAA.
II.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Before Congress enacted the 1972 Amendments to the Federal
12. Id. at 91.
13. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the controversy ...arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (amended 1980). The Court held for the first time that the word "laws" in § 1331(a)
allows claims brought under the federal common law. 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972). The Court further
indicated that the existence of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act also supports the view
that the regulation of interstate waters presents a federal interest requiring the use of the federal
common law. Id. at 104.
14. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (1981).
15. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
16. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(amended 1977).
17. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1793 (1981). S.REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3675. F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, § 3.03 at 3-81 (1981) [hereinafter cited as GRAD].
18. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1793 (1981).
19. 406 U.S. at 107. For further explanation of the Court's position, see note 57 infra.
20. 101 S.Ct. 1784 (1981).
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. The FWPCAA was further amended in 1977. Although few
substantive changes were made, the legislation is now referred to as the Clean Water Act of 1977,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. None of the 1977 changes were relevant to the City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois case, 101 S.Ct. 1784 (1981).
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Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 2 2 it placed the primary burden of regulating water pollution upon the states. 3 This approach
proved to be inadequate for two major reasons. First, "[m]ore than
four years after the deadline for submission of standards, only a little
more than half of the States [had] fully approved standards. ' 4 Second,
even in those states which had established standards, the only statutory
enforcement mechanism available to abate pollution, the conference
6
procedure, 25 did not effectively deter major violators.2 Because the
state-oriented scheme was not working, Congress shifted its focus to a
federal program, placing more emphasis on a regulatory network centrally controlled by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).2

22. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (amended 1977).
23. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3668, 3669. GRAD, supra note 17, at 3-53 to 3-56. The Senate Report points out that
post-1972 water pollution efforts were premised on the policy that: "The States shall lead the
national effort to prevent, control and abate water pollution. As a corollary, the Federal role has
been limited to support of, and assistance to, the States." S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3668, 3669. For example, water quality
standards were to be established by the states. Id. In addition, the job of enforcing water quality
standards rested primarily with the Governors of the states. Id.
24. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG., &
AD. NEWS 3668, 3671.
25. The conference procedure is an enforcement mechanism whereby the EPA Administrator calls a meeting for the purpose of establishing negotiations between the polluters, the parties
affected, and government officials when there appears to be a threat to the health and welfare of a
state's citizens as a result of the polluter's discharges. GRAD, supra note 17, at 3-60. This procedure seeks compliance with pollution standards through "conciliation and cooperation" between
the Administrator and the polluter. Id. at 3-62. Grad describes the result of the various stages of
the conference procedure:
Following the conference procedure, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
makes a recommendation to the state agency to take whatever action may emerge as appropriate from the conference. . . .If the problem is not resolved by state action, a second
step takes place, namely a formal hearing before a board appointed by the administrator.
The polluter is called before the hearing and the hearing may result in a direction to the
polluter that abatement measures be taken within a reasonable time. . . .If no abatement
measures are taken within the time provided by the direction of the conference, the Administrator may-but is not required to-make a request to the Attorney General to bring a
suit for abatement-i.e., injuctive relief-on behalf of the United States.
Id. The inadequacy of this procedure is demonstrated by the fact that: "[siome fifty informal
conferences were held through 1971, only four continued to the hearing stage, and only a single
case was taken to court following the conference procedure during the entire 24 years of its availability." Id. at 3-61.
26. Id. at 3-63. The conference procedure is ineffective in deterring major violators because
the courts lack sufficient powers. Id. at 3-61. The courts may only issue injunctions; they may not
impose civil penalties such as fines. Id.
27. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792-93. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG., & AD. NEWS 3668, 3675.
The establishment of federal water quality standards-or actually water quality standards
proposed by the states which then would, upon adoption, become the federally accepted
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As amended, the FWPCA requires the Administrator of the EPA
to establish uniform national effluent limitation 8 standards.' Some
states may retain their current water quality standards to the extent
that the permitted levels of pollution not only comply with the guidelines of the Act, but also meet with the Administrator's approval.8 0
Under the amendments, the Administrator has the authority to require
a state to adopt more stringent effluent limitations if he deems it necessary or desirable.8 1
The creation of a pollution permit system called the "National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System" (NPDES) is an innovative
feature of the 1972 amendments.83 The permits are issued by either the
Administrator or appropriate state agency. 8 A permit establishes effluent limitations and overflow standards for specific point sources" based
on a public hearing determining the ability of the particular polluter to
meet such discharge levels. 85 The primary importance of the permit
standards-meant that the federal government would aim at the improvement of water
quality, but would accept situations where waters would be kept in their present condition-i.e., not be permitted to deteriorate any further-as long as their quality was adequate for particulai designated purposes.
GRAD, supra note 17, at 3-81.
28. An effluent limitation is the elimination or appropriate restriction on the amount of
discharge of pollutants for a point source. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1976), construed in E. I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (EPA has the authority to limit discharges by existing plants through industrywide regulations setting forth uniform effluent limitations). For factors used in setting effluent limitations, see 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976). Even though the FWPCAA allows the Administrator to establish only guidelines for effluent limitations, the word "guidelines" has been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court to allow the Administrator to establish specific effluent limitations
for a particular pollution source. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 126-36
(1977).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(1), (2) (1976).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). The City of Milwaukee obtained its permits from "the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR), which duly qualified under . . . 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b), as a permit granting agency under the superintendance of the EPA." 101 S. Ct. 1784,
1789 (1981). The permits issued to Milwaukee dealt with both overflows and discharges of sewage. Id. at 1794. For details of Milwaukee's permit requirements, see Id.
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
34. A point source is defined as "any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance . . .
from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1976).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1976). Any state whose waters may be affected by the issuance
of the permit must be notified of the permit application and must be given the opportunity to
participate in the hearings. Id. In addition, the state whose waters may be affected must have the
opportunity to submit written recommendations to the permit issuing state and to the Administrator. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1976). The offending state must either accept the affected state's
recommendations or inform the Administrator why they were rejected. Id. Finally, "[u~nder ...
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(A), the EPA may veto any permit issued by a State when waters of
another State may be affected." 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1797 (1981). In City of Milwaukee, the Court
found these administrative procedures provided adequate means by which Illinois could seek relief
from the pollution of another state. Id. For a further explanation of the majority and dissenting
Published
by eCommons, 1981
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system is that the Administrator uses it as a mechanism to enforce the
Act,8 6 which prohibits any discharge of pollutants into interstate waters
unless pursuant to a permit.3 7 Conversely, meeting the conditions of a
permit is deemed the equivalent of compliance per se with the Act's
standards.3 8
One of Congress' primary purposes behind amending the FWPCA
was to provide a national uniform enforcement procedure. 3 9 National
uniformity is necessary to effectuate the congressional policy of discouraging industries from forum-shopping for locations in states with
less demanding water quality standards or without stringent enforcement. 40 This policy is important in maintaining a balance of industry
among the states. 1
The FWPCAA provide a number of mechanisms to enforce a permit violation. When a state is inadequately enforcing permit requirements or pollution standards, the Administrator may issue a compliance order or institute civil proceedings against the polluter for
appropriate relief. 42 The remedy is generally in the form of an injunction, fines, or both. 43 Even without a permit or standard violation, the
Administrator may seek an injunction on the grounds that a pollution

positions, see text accompanying notes 117-127 infra.
36. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1789-95 (1981). The permits are effective because:
Such direct restrictions on discharges facilitate enforcement by making it unnecessary to
work backward from an overpolluted body of water to determine which point sources are
responsible and which must be abated. In addition, a discharger's performance is now measured against strict technology-based effluent limitations-specified levels of treatment-to
which it must conform, rather than against limitations derived from water quality standards to which it and other polluters must collectively conform.
EPA v. California State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1976). In City of
Milwaukee, the state agency (DNR) successfully brought an action in the state court enforcing
the permit requirements. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1789 (1981). Since these requirements still were not
adequate to protect Illinois, ,the federal district court, on remand from Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972), rendered a judgment imposing more stringent effluent limitations than required in
the state permit. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1789 (1981).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
39. GRAD, supra note. 17, at 3-81. The FWPCAA no longer relies on water quality standards set by the states as the primary enforcement standard for determining whether a pollution
violation is occurring. Id. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3675. The effluent limitations and permits replaced the "water
quality standards." Id.
40. GRAD, supra note 17, at 3-86.
41. Id.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1976). The Administrator is authorized to commence these
proceedings for permanent and temporary injunctions to restrain any violation for which he is
authorized to issue a compliance order. GRAD, supra note 17, at 3-164.2 to 3-165. Both the issuance of a compliance order and the commencement of judicial proceedings are left to the discretion of the Administrator. Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/11
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source shows present, imminent, or substantial danger to health or wel-

fare." Even a citizen

5

may bring an action against a pollution source

6
which has allegedly violated any effluent limitation or permit.4
The problem with the FWPCAA, addressed in City of Milwau7
kee, is that Milwaukee's discharges of sewage into Lake Michigan
did not violate the conditions of its permit.48 Consequently, Milwaukee
was in compliance per se with the FWPCAA, leaving Illinois no basis
for invoking the Act's enforcement provisions. 49 Nevertheless, the efflu-

ent limitations established by the Milwaukee permit were insufficient to
protect Illinois' citizens from health hazards.5" Illinois brought a nui-

sance action to attempt to have its own higher effluent limitations im5 1
posed upon Milwaukee.
III.

FACTS AND HOLDING

The City of Milwaukee operated sewer systems under a NPDES
permit granted by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
under standards promulgated by the EPA Administrator.'

In the origi-

nal suit,'3 Illinois instituted an action against the City of Milwaukee in
the United States Supreme Court, invoking the Court's original jurisdiction." Illinois claimed its citizens were being harmed by overflows
into Lake Michigan of inadequately treated sewage from Milwaukee's

plants." The United States Supreme Court refused to hear the merits," but did permit Illinois to go back to the federal district court to

seek remedies under a federal common law nuisance action.' 7
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1976).
45. The FWPCAA defines "citizen" as "a person or persons having an interest which is or
may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1976). See Sierra Club v. Mortan, 405 U.S.
727, 734-35 (1972) (the citizen must have been injured in fact).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1976).
47. 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
48. Id. at 1810 n.32. Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution:Statutory Preemption or Preservation?49 FORDHAM L. REV. 500, 530 (1981) (discusses the deficiency in the FWPCAA in dealing with the City of Milwaukee situations where both states are in compliance with
their permit requirements).
49. See note 48 supra.
50. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1788 (1981).
51. Id. at 1794.
52. Id. at 1789.
53. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
54. Id. at 93.
55. Id.
56. 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). The Court decided that it would exercise its original jurisdiction only when necessary because of the inordinate amount of time required to hear and dispose of
such cases. Id. For additional evidence on the amount of time spent on litigating interstate pollution cases, see Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preservation? 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 500, 506 n.37 (1981).
57. 406
U.S. 91, 108 (1972).
Published
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Six months after Congress passed the FWPCAA," Illinois instituted the present suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, seeking to have Milwaukee's discharges
abated. In 1977,60 after finding Illinois had sufficiently established a
nuisance under the federal common law, the district court ordered Milwaukee to "eliminate all overflows and to achieve specified effluent limitations on treated sewage." e1 The district court's order established effluent limitations and overflow standards more stringent than those
6
imposed under the procedures of the FWPCAA in the city's permit. 2
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit," the City of Milwaukee maintained that the FWPCAA were
preemptive of the federal common law, thus eliminating the possibility
of using a federal common law nuisance action to enforce more stringent standards on a neighboring state." The appellate court disagreed
with the argument, holding that the FWPCAA had not preempted the
federal common law." 5 Using the statute as a guideline, the appellate
court nevertheless refused to enforce effluent limitations more stringent
than mandated by the permit," but did require Milwaukee to comply
with the timetable that the lower court had set for the elimination of
overflows. 7
The City of Milwaukee appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, challenging the seventh circuit's decision upholding the district
court's order to eliminate overflows within the designated timetable."
The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's decision,"9 overruling

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970), did not preempt the federal common law nuisance action. Justice Douglas wrote: "It may happen that new federal laws and new
federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law nuisance. But until that
comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging
creation of a public nuisance by water pollution." 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
58. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
59. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1788 (1981).
60. Although the suit was promptly initiated in 1972, the actual trial did not commence

until 1977. Id. at 1788-89. A significant part of this five year delay was attributed to "three years
of pretrial discovery." Id. at 1800 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1789.
62. id.
63. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
64. Id..at 157-64; 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1789 (1981).
65. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 599 F.2d 151, 162-63 (7th Cir. 1979).
66. Id. at 176.
67. Id. at 177. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1790 (1981). The timetable and standards concerning the
elimination of overflows established by the district court were more stringent than overflow requirements in the permit. Id. The court of appeals upheld these more stringent requirements because the need for higher standards for overflows was reasonable and supported by adequate evidence. 599 F.2d 151, 170-72.
68.

101 S. Ct. 1784, 1790 (1981).

69. Id. at 1800.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/11
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Illinois v. Milwaukee,70 sub silentio, by holding that the FWPCAA
had precluded the use of the federal common law nuisance action.7 1
The decision prevents a state injured by the water pollution of another
state from using a nuisance action to impose effluent or overflow standards more stringent than those established under the Act upon the
polluting state.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Court's Rationale-FederalCommon Law

The Court's analysis of the continued availability of the federal
common law nuisance action began with the assumption that only Congress should set the standards which will be used to effectuate the federal law. 72 The majority relied heavily upon the cases Arizona v. California78 and Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,74 in which the Court

refused to apply the federal common law principles, deferring instead
to the statutory schemes for the apportionment of interstate waters and
for damages calculations under maritime law, respectively. 75 The City
of Milwaukee Court maintained that these cases stand for the proposition that when Congress directly addresses a question, courts are no
longer free to provide their own rules of decision. 7 The Court considered deference to the legislature in such a situation important to the
70. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
71. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1793 (1981).
72. Id. at 1790. The City of Milwaukee Court cited Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363 (1943) as standing for the proposition that the federal common law may be used by
the courts only "in the absence of any applicable Act of Congress." Id. at 367. This is not necessarily accurate. Justice Douglas, writing for the Clearfield Court, claimed that the absence of a
congressional Act was merely one instance, not the only one, in which Courts were allowed to use
federal common law. Id. at 366-67. This is evident from the fact that, despite the presence of
congressional regulations on the subject, Justice Douglas applied the federal common law to fashion a rule of decision. Id. at 365-66. For further support of this interpretation of the Douglas
opinion in Clearfield, see Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption. 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024, 1037 (1967).
73. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated: "Where Congress
has so exercised its constitutional power over waters, courts have no power to substitute their own
notions of 'an equitable apportionment' for the apportionment chosen by Congress." Id. at 565-66.
74. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
75. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1791 (1981). Justice Blackmun, dissenting in City of Milwaukee, complained that the majority gave Arizona v. California and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham too
broad an interpretation. Id. at 1803 n.7. He contended that these cases do not hold that any action
by Congress in a particular field precludes the use of the federal common law. Id. He reasoned
that in each case the Court deferred to the legislature's judgment concerning a particular aspect
of a broad field-i.e., apportionment and damages. Id. Justice Blackmun found City of Milwaukee distinguishable because "unlike the statutes at issue in these two cases, the 1972 Act addressed a broad and complex subject to which state and federal law had previously spoken, and in
doing so recognized and encouraged many different approaches to controlling water pollution." Id.
76. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1791 (1981).
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preservation of the separation of powers doctrine." Based upon this
view, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the City of Milwaukee majority,
concluded the federal common law nuisance action was preempted by
the FWPCAA, reasoning that any action by Congress in a given area
eliminates the necessity for a federal rule of decision.78 Justice Blackmun, dissenting, condemned this approach for its "automatic displacement" of the federal common law. 7 9 He viewed congressional action in
an area previously a subject of federal common law as not presumptively extinguishing the federal courts' role in water pollution controversies. s0 Justice Blackmun's dissenting position is supported by the

fact that the federal common law has historically served the function of
filling gaps in federal legislation.81 Thus it should continue to be used
as a supplement to the FWPCAA. A weakness in the dissent, however,
is its failure to point to specific gaps in the FWPCAA. Although Justice Blackmun intimated that the federal common law is needed to set-

77. The separation of powers doctrine is a long-standing principle of our American government which stresses that one branch (executive, legislative, or judicial) of our government should
not encroach upon the judgment, functions, and power of the other branches. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16 (1978). "Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided
the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the
courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1977).
Autonomy is necessary to those branches to preserve their legitimacy and accountability when
they exercise their appropriate and designated powers. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 16 (1978). In City of Milwaukee, Justice Rehnquist warned that if the federal courts were
permitted to establish their own standards regarding water pollution under the guise of federal
common law, then the judiciary would be encroaching on the designated authority and functions
of the legislature. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1791 (1981).
78. Id. at 1790-92.
79. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1801 (1981). Justice Blackmun pointed out that the majority's "automatic displacement" approach was erroneous because "It fails to reflect the unique role federal
common law plays in resolving disputes between one State and the citizens or government of
another. In addition, it ignores this Court's frequent recognition that federal common law may
complement congressional action in the fulfillment of federal policies." Id.
80. Id.
81. Justice Blackmun explained that the basis of the federal common law's gap-filling function is "to effectuate federal interests embodied either in the Constitution or an Act of Congress."
101 S. Ct. 1784, 1801 (1981). For a discussion of interstate water pollution as a federal interest,
see note 3 supra.
At the very least, effective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal
courts to declare as a matter of common law or "judicial legislation," rules which may be
necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted by
Congress. In other words, it must mean recognition of federal judicial competence to declare the governing law in an area comprising issues substantially related to an established
program of government operation.
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law".- Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957). For further discussion
of the federal common law's gap-filling function, see Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1028-29 (1967); Friendly, In Praise
of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 407-16 (1964).
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tie disputes between two states, he did not explicitly demonstrate that
the Act is inadequate for dealing with such controversies.
The Court justified its decision to abolish federal common law and
overturn Illinois v. Milwaukee"2 based upon three changes brought
about by the FWPCAA 8 in 1972, which the majority found had eliminated the need for any gap-filling function for the federal common
law. 84 First, the Court noted that the FWPCAA as a whole were comprehensive, thus leaving no gaps in the legislation. 5 Second, the Court
reasoned that the change from water quality standards to the federal
effluent limitations and permit system solved any problems with establishing standards. 86 Third, unlike the situation in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 87 Illinois had a forum under the FWPCAA to hear its dispute."
Emphasizing that the FWPCAA were a total restructuring of the
FWPCA, 8 ' the Court looked to the legislative history and found that
the comments of the individual legislators" on the FWPCAA's comprehensiveness demonstrated a congressional intent to preempt the federal common law. 91 Justice Blackmun is correct in his statements that
the Court placed too much emphasis on the legislators' references to
the statute's comprehensiveness." Justice Blackmun pointed out that
the approach taken by the City of Milwaukee majority is inconsistent
with the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee.'3 Similar legislative comments on the statute's comprehensiveness were present there, but the
Court nevertheless gave formal recognition to the federal common law
nuisance action as a remedy necessary to supplement the statute.' Referring to this resulting inconsistency, Justice Blackmun said that the
Court could ill afford to articulate a test under which a legislator's
comments are dispositive of the issue whether there are any gaps to be
filled in the legislation. 95 This position is further supported by the general rule that legislative comments concerning a specific statute have

82. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
83. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
84. 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
85. Id. at 1792-93.
86. Id. at 1794.
87. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
88. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1796-97 (1981).
89. Id. at 1792. For an examination of several of the more important changes in the statute,
see text accompanying notes 22-51 supra.
90. 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1792-93 n.12 (1981).
91. Id. at 1793.
92. Id. at 1805.
93. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). For legislators' comments referring to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act as comprehensive, see 101 S. Ct. at 1805 n.13 (1981).
94. 101 S.Ct. at 1805.
95.

Id.
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generally been given some weight in interpreting a statute, but clearly
not to the extent of being conclusive as the majority proposes."
A problem with using "comprehensive" as a catchword precluding
the federal common law is that it leaves the power of the federal courts
to fashion a rule of decision solely in the hands of the legislators. They
may very well preempt the federal courts' authority with a mere reference to a statute as "comprehensive." This, in turn, could have deleterious effects on the separation of powers doctrine and the functions and
legitimacy of the federal courts.
The Court also stressed that there was no gap to be filled by courtimposed pollution standards because in the FWCPAA Congress
designed an elaborate administrative scheme to solve problems concerning effluent limitations."7 The majority claimed that if a federal court
adopted limitations or standards more stringent than imposed under the
FWPCAA, it would, in effect, be merely substituting a court's judgment for that of the expert administrative agency established by Congress. 98 The City of Milwaukee Court held that by doing this, the district court went beyond its authority under the common law gap-filling
function. 99 It concluded that because of the legislative regulatory approach, "there [was] no room" for the federal common law.1 00
Contrary to Justice Rehnquist's analysis, the issue before the district court did not involve the substitution of one regulatory scheme for
another, but instead a determination whether states could obtain an
adequate remedy from the provisions of the FWPCAA.10 1 That legislation may be comprehensive in terms of effluent limitation standards
does not prevent the statute from being wholly inadequate in providing
a remedy to the injured party. In fact, the FWPCAA do not expressly
provide for a damages remedy for injuries sustained by violations of the
Act.10 2 Since the case Cort v. Ash,"° the Supreme Court generally

96. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1946) (views
and opinions of individual legislators are not authoritative in construing a statute); Consumer
Product Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980) (contemporaneous remarks of a legislator are not controlling in analyzing legislative history); Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980) (the starting point in interpreting a statute is the language of the statute
itself).
97. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1794 (1981).
98. Id. at 1796.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1977). As in City of Milwaukee,
the Mobil Oil Corp. Court addressed the issue whether gaps existed in a federal statute because of
a lack of adequate remedies. The Court said: "There is a basic difference between filling a gap left
by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted."
Id. at 625.
102. National Sea Clammers Ass'n. v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1233 n.31 (1980).
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analyzes a statute in terms of four factors to discover whether a private
cause of action can be inferred from its provisions. 1 " The majority did
not apply the Cort v. Ash'10 analysis to the FWPCAA.
In National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York,'" the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, applying the four-factored test, found a

damages action for citizens implicit in the FWPCAA. 10 The seventh

circuit first reasoned that one of the general purposes behind the

FWPCAA was to protect private citizens from actual injury caused by
pollution.108 Therefore, an individual is one of the class which the statute was intended to benefit. 1 "9 Second, the court found that the "savings clause" 1 10 of the statute shows a congressional intent to preserve

an individual's right to bring an action for damages. 1 Third, the court
held that the ability of a private citizen to bring an action seeking damages would help effectuate the purposes of the FWPCAA by aiding in

achieving the goals of eliminating pollution and preserving the environ-

ment. 1 ' Fourth, the court reasoned that interstate water pollution was

traditionally an area of federal concern with very little state involvement, 1

thus it was appropriate for the federal courts to provide the

103. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
104. Id. at 78.
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing
one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted ... " That is, does the statute create a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of the legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . .Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff. .
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to State law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so (that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law?
Id. The principle use of these factors is to determine legislative intent. Touche Ross & Co. v.
Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
105. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
106. 616 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), modified, 101 S. Ct. 1509 (1981).
107. Id. at 1229.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. A savings clause is defined as: "In a statute ... a restriction in a repealing act, which
is intended to save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc., from the annihilation which would
result from an unrestricted repeal." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1205 (5th ed. 1979). The savings
clause in the FWPCAA is 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976). This section provides: "Nothing in this
section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute
or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other
relief (including relief against the Administrator of State agency)." Id. For the Supreme Court's
treatment of this section, see text accompanying notes 137-46, infra.
111. 616 F.2d at 1230.
112. Id.
113. For a discussion of the federal interest in interstate water pollution, see notes 3-8.
supra.
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primary mechanism for relief."' Even circuits failing to infer a private
cause of action from the FWPCAA, " 6 have agreed that the federal
common law nuisance action remains available to a private citizen to
sue for damages.110
When confronting the issue whether Illinois had a forum to protect
its interests, the City of Milwaukee Court addressed the third change
in circumstance eliminating the gap-filling function of the federal common law. The Court acknowledged that one of its core concerns in Illinois v. Milwaukee"11 7 was that if the Court failed to permit a common
law nuisance action, Illinois would not have a forum to hear its dispute. 118 The Court said, however, that this concern no longer existed
because of the passage of the FWPCAA.11 9 It reasoned that Congress
provided numerous administrative procedures1 20 by which a state could
bring a claim asking for pollution requirements more stringent than
those which were in effect under a permit." The Court noted that
Illinois had not exhausted any of the FWPCAA's administrative procedures designed to effect a change in the effluent limitations before
bringing suit. 22
Justice Blackmun is correct in his contention that Congress never
intended that the FWPCAA prevent a federal court from hearing an
action because of a party's failure to fully exhaust administrative remedies. 123 Congress made an injured state's participation in the permitgranting procedures of another state purely "voluntary and optional."'" Justice Blackmun reasoned that such nonmandatory procedures could not operate as a jurisdictional bar to bringing a court ac114. 616 F.2d at 1233.
115. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
116. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1233 (7th Cir.
1980) (the common law nuisance action is available in suits by private parties attempting to receive damages awards); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008,
cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1025 (1979) (despite the court's finding that Congress did not intend to
create a private right of action for damages in the FWPCAA, it held that a municipality could
maintain a federal common law nuisance action for damages). Contra, Note, Federal Common
Law and Water Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preservation? 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 500
(1981), in which the author takes the view that the federal common law should not be continued
for the purpose of providing compensation for private injuries because Congress provided a
"mechanism for compensating injuries caused by pollution activities." Id. at 519. In effect, the
author contends that redress for injuries under nuisance should be brought under the state common law because that is the common law which the savings clause preserved. Id. at 519-20.
117. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
118. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (1981).
119. Id.
120. For a discussion of these administrative procedures, see notes 32-36 supra.
121. 101 S. Ct. at 1797.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1807.
124. Id.
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tion. 5 In fact, at the time Illinois brought the nuisance action, it had
1 26
exhausted without success all administrative remedies then available.
Justice Blackmun criticized the Court for its dicta implying Illinois had
the burden of going back to pursue administrative127procedures under the
FWPCAA after the state had brought the suit.
B.

The Court's Rationale--StatutoryInterpretation

The City of Milwaukee Court rejected Illinois' contention that
Congress intended to preserve the common law nuisance action through
section 510128 and section 505(e)1 29 of the FWPCAA. Section 510 allows the states to adopt and enforce effluent limitations more stringent
than those established under the guidelines of the FWPCAA. 80 Section 505(e) is a savings clause which preserves a person's right to sue
under any statute or common
law for enforcement of a standard or to
"seek any other relief."18 ' Looking at section 510, the Court said that
Congress clearly intended for the more stringent standards allowed by
section 510 to be imposed by state administrative processes solely upon
"in-state" discharges. 8 2 Because the federal common law would create
a federal standard, the Court reasoned that a federal rule of decision is
inappropriate and unnecessary for enforcing more stringent standards
"in-state." 8
The Court's interpretation of section 510 is questionable. It failed
to justify its interpretation as to the "in-state" nature of section 510 by
referring to any specific statutory language. Nor did the Court cite to
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1806 n.18.
127.

Id. at 1806.

128. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976). In its discussion in City of Milwaukee, the Court cites to the
FWPCAA §§ 510 and 505(e) instead of the parallel United States Code section. For clarity and
consistency, the text of this casenote will follow the Court's use of §§ 510 and 505(e), however,
the footnotes will continue to cite to the applicable United States Code sections.
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
130. In full, § 1370 (§ 510) provides:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or
deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or
enforce (a) any standard or limitation respecting discharges or pollutants or (b) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if any effluent limitation or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard
of performance is in effect under this chapter such State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or any other limitation,
effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or (2) be construed as impairing or
in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters
(including boundary waters) of such States.
131. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976). For a discussion at the savings clause 33 U.S.C. §
1365(e), see note 110 supra.
132.

101 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (1981).

133.

Id.
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any legislative history which might have provided support for its interpretation. Section 510 gives a state the explicit right "to adopt or enforce any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants."""
There is no express qualification in the wording which limits the application of more stringent effluent standards to exclusively "in-state" discharges. Based upon the language of section 510, it would have been
just as logical for the Court to conclude that the more stringent standards applied to both in-state and out-of-state discharges which affect
waters in or bounding the state. This interpretation would comport not
only with the FWPCAA's goal of encouraging states to assist in the
interstate water pollution problem, but also with administrative procedures designed to allow a state to participate in another state's permitgranting process when the outcome of the process may have an effect
on waters in non-permit-seeking states.
In addition, the majority's interpretation of section 510 is weakened by its failure to consider the impact of the second clause in section
510 on its position that this section did not preserve the federal common law nuisance action. This clause provides that section 510 is not to
be construed as "impairing or.

.

. affecting" any right or jurisdiction a

state may possess with regard to boundary waters.185 Since the Court
had previously recognized the right of a state to protect its quasi-sovereign ecological right in its environment and natural resources from interstate pollution sources, s6 the second clause in section 510 apparently preserves that right.1 7 To the extent that the state's ecological
rights are to be protected, section 510 appears to have implicitly preserved the federal common law nuisance action as a valuable tool for
protecting that right.'"
When interpreting section 505(e), the Court gave special significance to the words "this section," 1 9 finding that these words evince an
intent on the part of Congress merely to preserve individual rights and
remedies, which does not prevent the statute as a whole from preempt-

134. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976).
135. Id.
136. For cases dealing with a state's quasi-sovereign right to protect its environment, see
note 7 supra.
137. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1804-06 (1981) (the dissent's analysis combines both § 1370 (Q 510)
and § 1365(e) (Q 505(e)), concluding that Congress intended to preserve the state's right to defend its ecological rights). Contra, Fort, The Necessary Demise of Federal Common Law Nuisance, 12 Loy. Cm. L.J. 131, 157-59 (1981) (the author takes the position that § 1370 (§ 510)
preserves only state law because the section allows states to adopt standards that are more stringent than imposed under the FWPCAA).
138. Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preserva-

tion?2 49
139.

FORDHAM

L.

REV.

500, 524-34 (1981).

101 S. Ct. 1784, 1798 (1981).
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ing the federal common law nuisance action. 140 Even so, the City of
Milwaukee Court suggested that the reference to the preservation of
common law remedies meant state as opposed to federal common
1 41

law.

The Court's sparse analysis of section 505(e) completely over-

looked not only the express language of the section, but also evidence of
a congressional intent to preserve the federal common law.142 The
phrase "statute or common law" does not contain any language sug-

gesting that it is limited to only state common law. Congress is generally presumed to be aware of and incorporate into a legislative enactment all preexisting common law rights and duties, unless it uses
express words to the contrary. 4s Based upon this statutory construction
principle, the more logical interpretation of section 505(e) would be
that the general reference to the "common law" preserves both state
and federal common law, because there is no express preclusion of the
federal common law nuisance action.
Justice Blackmun condemned the City of Milwaukee majority for
ignoring legislative comments which showed that section 505(e) was
clearly intended to preserve federal common law nuisance actions.1 44
He said that if one followed the Court's interpretation of the words
"this section" as to the scope of the remedies which section 505(e) preserves, the consequence would be to extinguish all preexisting remedies

both inside and outside the FWPCAA.1 45 He noted that this was

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Concerning § 1365(e), Justice Blackmun noted: "In my view, the language and structure of the Clean Water Act leaves no doubt that Congress intended to preserve the federal common law." Id. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun pointed to a discussion in the
legislative debates on § 1365 between Senators Griffin, Muskie, and Hart concerning a pending
interstate pollution suit based on a federal common law nuisance action. Id. at 1806. All the
Senators were in agreement that the FWPCAA "would not affect or hinder the suit now pending
against the Reserve Mining Co. under the Refuse Act of 1899 . . . [,J the existing Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, or other law." Id. Thus the legislative debates demonstrate a Congressional
intent to preserve the federal common law. For a list of further authorities showing legislative
intent to preserve the federal common law nuisance action through § 1365(e), see 101 S. Ct. 1784,
1806 n.17 (1981); Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutory Preemption or
Preservation?49 FORDHAM L. REV. 500, 528 n.176 (1981). For the majority's response to Blackmun's interpretation of the Griffin, Hart, and Muskie colloquy, see 101 S. Ct. at 1798-1800.
143. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1946). "Statutes which in
general terms divest preexisting rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without a
clear expression of implication to that effect." Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (citing
United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. at 272).
144. For evidence of congressional intent to preserve the federal common law, see note 137
supra.
145. 101 S.Ct. at 1805 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun offered a more plausible interpretation of § 1365(e): "I would construe the reference to "this section" as simply
preventing pre-existing rights of action from being subjected to the procedural and jurisdictional
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clearly contrary to congressional intent permitting more stringent remedies under both federal and state laws. 1 8 Finally, Justice Blackmun
pointed out that all the other federal courts which have dealt with section 505(e) have concluded that Congress intended to preserve the federal common law nuisance action when it enacted that priovision of the
FWPCAA.14 7 Other cases also stressed the importance of the nuisance
action in enforcing and remedying violations of the FWPCAA.14 8 The
City of Milwaukee majority concluded that the federal common law
was" preempted without addressing this substantial number of lower
court opinions.
V.

CONCLUSION

The factual setting in City of Milwaukee illustrates an inherent
problem with the remedial and enforcement provisions of the
FWPCAA, if the United States Supreme Court abolishes a federal judicial mechanism available to supplement the administrative permitgranting processes. Because Milwaukee was complying with the
requirements of its permit, the enforcement mechanisms of the
FWPCAA could not be commenced in order to provide immediate relief to Illinois. Additionally, the invocation of alternatives such as the
permit-granting process or civil proceedings is entirely up to the Administrator's discretion. Consequently, Illinois itself is not left with the
option of effectively defending its own quasi-sovereign rights and interests as injury to the health of its citizens continues.
Even with the FWPCAA, the federal common law nuisance action
could still provide an effective federal tool for enforcing interstate
water pollution standards to solve problems such as- that in the City of
Milwaukee case. There is nothing to suggest that the federal courts
could not work within the guidelines of the permits and standards established by the EPA Administrator in fashioning an equitable remedy.
In addition, several factors which are commonly used by the Supreme
Court to trigger the application of the common law taken not only from
pollution cases, but also the legislative history of the FWPCAA, point
to the continued use and viability of the federal common law nuisance
action: (1) there is a dispute between two states; (2) a federal interest

limitations imposed by § 505 on persons who could sue under the Act." id.
146. Id.
147. For federal courts which have held that § 1365(e) (§ 505(e)) preserves the federal
common law nuisance action, see National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d
1222, 1233-35 (3d Cir. 1980), modified, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981); City of Evansville v. Kentucky
Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008, 1017-19 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025
(1980); California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181, 193 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1980).
148. See text accompanying notes 139-40 supra.
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is involved-interstate water pollution; (3) federal legislation creates a
federally enforceable right; (4) there is a need for a uniform rule of
decision; (5) Congress intended to preserve the federal common
law-at least it is not expressly prohibited; (6) the FWPCAA provide
inadequate injunctive and damages remedies for an individual or state
injured by another state's pollution. Nothing in the statute or its legislative history except the word "comprehensive" suggests that the nuisance action and the FWPCAA could not work hand-in-hand to enforce national pollution standards. Yet, City of Milwaukee has the
effect of emasculating the grant of original jurisdiction given to the
federal courts in Illinois v. Milwaukee by holding that the FWPCAA
preempt a federal common law nuisance action attempting to abate extraterritorial water pollution.
Jeffrey L. Rulon
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